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China's Information Warfare 
Discourse: Implications for 
Asymmetric Conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait* 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
This paper discusses the emerging discourse on, and capability of 
the PRC in, information warfare (IW)--as well as the implications of such 
developments for cross-Strait and U.S.-PRC relations. Chinese discourse 
shows that informed PLA officers realize that IW constitutes the war of the 
future and plays a critical role in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
--a key step necessary for China's military modernization. One allure of 
this type of warfare is the potential for China to wage an "asymmetric war" 
-i.e., the use of surprise force b.v a weaker party against a stronger but 
vulnerable adversary-by applying traditional stratagems. The Chinese 
argue that using such traditional maxims as Sun Tzu's "overcoming the su-
perior with the inferior" and Mao Zedong's ''people's war" in modern war-
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fare would both counter overall American strengths by focusing on certain 
''pockets of excellence" and present China with a credible military option 
for achieving its political objective of unification with Taiwan (on Beijing's 
terms). These strategic considerations could, however, introduce instabil-
ity into the Taiwan Strait; they also challenge conventional wisdom in 
international relations. This paper critically evaluates the doctrinal-capa-
bility gap in China's IW development-the double-edged nature of technol-
ogy, the low connectivity of Chinese society, and Taiwan's responses-and 
concludes with a cautionary note on an emergent digital "mutual assured 
destruction" (MAD) dynamic across the Taiwan Strait. 
KEYWoRDs: information warfare; asymmetric war; unrestricted warfare; 
cross-Strait relations; Sun Tzu. 
* * * 
"War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; 
the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." 
-Sun Tzu (-i.f.-=f-)1 
In September 2002, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian (~ ~ jfJ) 
warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had been developing 
strategies to wage unrestricted warfare (:it!FR~, chaoxian zhan) against 
Taiwan. Chen explained that, in contrast to traditional warfare, unrestricted 
warfare would include using such tactics as the fifth column, cruise mis-
siles, electromagnetic pulse attacks, biochemical weapons, and computer 
network hacking to launch a surprise attack against Taiwan's infrastructure, 
command and control system, and political, economic, and financial 
centers.2 Chen's speech, delivered on the eve of the first anniversary of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, 
D.C., underscored Taiwan's anxiety over the increasing threat posed by the 
rapid modernization of both the capabilities and doctrines of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA). 
1Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
opening statement. 
2
"Dalu junshi weihe bi kongbu geng lihai" (Mainland China's military intimidation is more 
serious than terror), BBC Chinese.com, September 10, 2002, available online at <http:// 
news.bbc.co.uklhilchinese/news/newsid _ 2248000/22482941.stm>. 
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Viewed from a politico-military standpoint, the heightened attention 
paid to unconventional forms of warfare signifies that the complex cross-
Strait relationship is entering a new-and arguably-unstable, era. Up 
until the present, despite having witnessed spasmodic flareups, the cross-
Strait relationship is essentially a political stalemate with no imminent 
military crisis on the horizon. To a large extent, two layers of deterrence-
resistance by Taiwan's armed forces and the possible but not preordained 
intervention by the United States-have thwarted any PLA military adven-
ture against Taiwan. 
The hitherto absence of war in the Taiwan Strait can be "explained" 
by two aphorisms that have been widely (and perhaps also uncritically) 
accepted by most international relations scholars and security analysts: (1) 
in a conflict, the party with preponderant force prevails-either by coercing 
the weaker party to take an action desired by the former (i.e., a situation 
of compellence) or by dissuading the weaker party from taking an action 
detested by the former (i.e., deterrence); and (2) despite refusing to re-
nounce the use of force against Taiwan, the PRC currently possesses few 
credible military options. As this paper will demonstrate, however, certain 
recent developmental trends in the PLA could upset the status quo in the 
Taiwan Strait. 
In recent years some well-versed military theorists and writers in the 
PLA have been exploring new concepts of war that call into question, if not 
invalidate, these two dictums. Of particular note is the PLA's fascination 
with asymmetric warfare strategies that make offense a more attractive 
option to the weaker party.3 One publication that has attracted considerable 
attention inside and outside China is Unrestricted Waifare.4 The authors, 
3For more discussion on the concept of "asymmetric conflicts," see Thazha V. Paul, Asym-
metric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Ben D. Mor, "'Asymmetric Conflicts': War Initiation by Weaker Powers," American 
Political Science Review 90, no. I (March 1996): 234-36; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the 
Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," International Security 26, no. 1 (Sum-
mer2001): 93-128. 
4Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chaoxian zhan (Unrestricted warfare) (Beijing: Jiefangjun 
wenyi chubanshe, 1999), available online at <http://www.shuku.n.et:8080/novels/wars/cx~h/ 
cxzh.html>. An English translation, provided by the CIA's Fore1gn Broadcast InformatiOn 
Service (FBIS), can be found at <http://cryptome.org/cuwOl.htm>. 
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who are both PLA colonels, envision the future of warfare as the following: 
War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated 
the right of weapons to label war ... while the appearance of ... new concepts of 
weapons has gradually blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack 
count as a hostile act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a coun-
try's economy be seen as a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse 
of a U.S. soldier in the streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the 
Americans to act as the world's policeman, thereby altering the world's strategic 
situation? And should an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or 
the results? Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war, ... 
there is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly 
realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future 
warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: warfare 
which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare. 
They continue on to identity the characteristics of unrestricted warfare: 
[T]his kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, that information 
will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere. It means that all 
weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the 
boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and 
non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it also means that many of the cur-
rent principles of combat will be modified, and even that the rules of war may 
need to be rewritten.5 
This paper discusses the emerging discourse on, and capability of 
the PRC in, information warfare (IW)-as well as the implications of 
such developments for conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Three reasons justifY 
a focus on IW. First, IW exemplifies unrestricted warfare and lends cre-
dence to the concept of asymmetric war. It challenges the conventional 
Clausewitzian view that "violence is the essence ofwar" by luring the in-
itiators of IW into thinking that they can achieve their political objectives 
without much sacrifice. Note that the Chinese view IW as a superior choice 
for attaining classic strategist Sun Tzu's adage: "To subdue the enemy with-
out fighting is the acme of skill. "6 
Second, many nations rely on information systems in the operation 
of their militaries, economies, and governments. This dependence on in-
5These two quotes are from FBIS translation, ibid. 
6Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77. 
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formation technology (IT) will only further increase under globalization, 
rendering the distance factor (geographic contiguity or force projection) ir-
relevant in war calculus. "Information systems now serve as both weapons 
and targets of warfare," declares Greg Rattray, the former commander of 
the U.S. Air Force Information Warfare Squadron.7 With dedicated respon-
sibilities for defending the United States from IW, Rattray worries that "the 
growing reliance of U.S. society on information infrastructures creates po-
tential new centers of gravity for enemy attack in strategic warfare based 
on disrupting and defending these infrastructures. "8 
Third, certain trends in the cross-Strait IT trade-such as the growing 
number and sophistication of Taiwan IT firms investing in the PRC as well 
as China's emergence as the world's fastest-growing (and one of the largest) 
IT producers-portend far-reaching changes in the cross-Strait balance 
of power.9 Fundamentally, developing IT constitutes a critical strategy in 
China's quest for greater international power. 10 History is replete with 
cases wherein technology alters the nature of war. Although a full discus-
sion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, the general gist of this 
argument should suffice to highlight the importance of the current study. 
This paper's main arguments are highlighted at the outset. First, the 
7Greg Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 8. 
8Ibid., I 0 1. 
9For a study on the impact of China's rising IT industry on Taiwan's economy, see Peggy 
Pei-chen Chang and Tun-jen Cheng, "The Rise of the Information Technology Industry in 
China: A Formidable Challenge to Taiwan's Economy," American Asian Review 20, no. 3 
(Fall2002): 125-74. For a work that expounds on the "Silicon Valley-Taiwan-Shanghai IT 
corridor" thesis, see Tse-Kang Leng, Zixun chanye quanqiuhua de zhengzhi fenxi: Yl 
Shanghaishi fazhan weili (A political analysis of the globalization of information in-
dustries: A case study of Shanghai) (Taipei: Ink, 2002). 
10For a new book that examines the IT rivalry for increased international power between 
China and India, the world's two most populous nations, see Marcus Franda, China and In-
dia Online (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). On the integration of the econ-
omies of Taiwan and the mainland as spearheaded by the electronics industry, see Barry 
Naughton, ed., The China Circle: Economics and Technology in the PRC, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997). On China's attempt to leap 
into the "information ag~" while retaining its unique socialist market characteristics, see 
Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan, China in the Information Age: Te/ecommunication_s and 
the Dilemmas of Reform (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997, for the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C.). 
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'Ji>RC's interests in IW reflect an increasingly prevalent view among strate-
gic thinkers in China that IW is a key catalyst for the PLA's Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) and a vital impetus for its military modernization. 
Second, China's IW strategy is distinctive in applying traditional 
stratagems (e.g., Sun Tzu's "overcoming the superior with the inferior" and 
Mao Zedong's [ -t.if ~] "people's war") to modem warfare in an attempt 
to overcome a technologically superior adversary (i.e., the United States) 
by attacking its strategic "Achilles' heel." China's IW strategy thus epito-
mizes asymmetric war. 11 
Finally, China is determined to seek to develop its IW capability into 
a credible military option: (1) for the absorption of Taiwan on Beijing's 
terms at some point in the future, and (2) in order to deter the United States 
from intervening in any cross-Strait conflict. 12 These trends increase the 
prospects for misperception and miscalculation and introduce new sources 
of instability into the cross-Strait relationship. 
For these reasons, a study of China's IW strategies is both timely and 
important. This paper will examine China's IW discourse and capability by 
focusing on the political objectives of China's IW and the implications of 
asymmetric warfare. 
TheNewWar 
Scholars have long been grappling with the impact of information 
11This is corroborated in the July 2002 Pentagon report to the U.S. Congress, which states 
that China "views information operations/information warfare (10/IW) as a strategic weap-
on ... " and "is particularly sensitive to the potential asymmetric applications IOIIW can have 
in any future conflict with a technologically superior adversary." See Department of De-
fense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (Report to 
Congress pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, July 12, 2002), 
available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf>. 
12 A Pentagon report points out that China's military is developing strategies and tactics to 
use "surprise, deception, and shock" in any opening military campaign, while "exploring 
coercive strategies" designed to bring Taiwan to terms quickly. See Department of State, 
"China is Considering a Coercive Strategy on Taiwan, DOD Says," e-mail update sent by 
Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State <uschinapd@ 
YAHOO.COM> to <US-CHINA@LIST.STATE.GOV> (July 16, 2002). 
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technology on international relations. 13 Experts have especially warned 
that the information revolution is enabling both new forms of organization 
and new doctrines that will affect the spectrum of conflict, including ter-
rorism.14 
In the aftermath of September 11, the prospect of "cyberterrorism" 
presents an especially frightening scenario to the world's only superpower 
-the United States. These terrorist attacks were characterized by their 
asymmetric war nature: a weaker party utilizing surprise, deception, and 
shock against a stronger party. 
Some scholars call September 11 "globalization's first war," arguing 
that what the terrorists attacked was globalization itself. 15 Most also be-
lieve, however, that globalization will bounce back. Globalization will 
continue to help facilitate the diffusion of information technology, which 
many view as globalization's quintessential hallmark. 16 This seemingly un-
stoppable trend may enable various state and nonstate actors (many with 
grievances toward U.S. power or policy) to eventually attain the technolog-
ical skill or opportunities to wreck havoc against the United States. 
Chances for such IW are not so remote. In the United States, the 
computer network is controlled by the private sector (i.e., those numerous 
companies whose main motive is profit), whereas defending national se-
curity falls under the purview of the military. 17 America's very strength, 
i.e., openness and accessibility of information, could tum into its Achilles' 
heel-if an adversary can exploit this weakness. 
13See Robert 0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information 
Age," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 81-94. 
14John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Information-Age Terrorism," Current 
History 99, no. 4 (April 2000): 179-85. 
15Kurt M. Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 1 (Win-
ter 2002): 7-14; and Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, eds., The Age of Terror: America 
and the World After September If (New York: Basic Books for the Yale Center for the 
Study of Globalization, 2002), vii-viii. 
16See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farar, Straus, & 
Giroux, 1999), 39-58. · 
17John Galvin, "Info War: The Enemy's Camp is a Cube on the Other Side of the Globe. Their 
Targets? Your Business," Ziff Davis Smart Business for the New Economy, June 1, 2001, 
72. 
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In 19?9, John Hamre, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, warned 
about the possibility of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" launched by hackers 
against American commercial interests. 18 James Adams, an Internet secu-
rity expert, has gone as far as to say that the virtual world is where the next 
war will be waged because, for the first time in history, the weapons are 
available to everyone. 19 
These trends are of keen interests to many of America's detractors. 
Dan Kuehl, a professor at the U.S. National Defense University, lists 
China, Russia, Iraq, Libya, terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, and even un-
savory organizations in friendly nations as "cyberthreats."20 In 1998 CIA 
Director George Tenet warned the Senate Government Affairs Committee 
that intrusion into government computers would become increasingly more 
sophisticated and better organized, with potential attackers including "na-
tional intelligence and military organizations, terrorists, criminals, indus-
trial competitors, hackers, and disgruntled or disloyal insiders." While 
declining to name names, Tenet confirmed that several nations had been 
working on developing an information warfare capability.21 
Just what is information warfare and how is it implemented? Accord-
ing to John Alger, former dean of the National Defense University's School 
of Information Warfare and Strategy, IW "consists of those actions in-
tended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information or infor-
mation resources in order to achieve a significant advantage, objective, or 
18
"Pentagon Officials Warn of an Electronic Pearl Harbor," Associated Press, March 9, 1999 
(accessed via Lexis-Nexus). · 
19James Adams, The Next World War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), gives an ex-
haustive history of information warfare, as well as U.S. military capabilities in this area. 
He states categorically that the Air Force can track hackers back to their computers and 
strike back with "computer bombs." However, many of America's enemies also have the 
same skills. 
2
°Cited in Galvin, "Info War" (see note 17 above). 
21 While Tenet declined to name those countries, Committee Chairman Fred Thompson (R-
Tenn) was not as reticent. Citing reports, Thompson named China, Russia, Libya, Iraq, 
Iran, and at least seven other countries as developing IW programs. See "CIA Director 
Warns of Intrusion into Government Computers," Associated Press, June 24, 1998 (ac-
cessed via Lexis-Nexus); and Jennifer Mateyaschuk, "Nothing to Raise a Glass About," 
Information Week, July 6, 1998, 16. 
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victory over an adversary.'122 The U.S. Air Force initially defined IW in 
1995 as "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's in-
formation and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and 
exploiting our own military information functions."23 The U.S. military es-
tablishment also expanded the concept in the late 1990s, however, to in-
clude "information operations" (10), which refer to "actions taken to affect 
adversary information or information systems while defending one's own 
information and information systems."24 
This conceptual enrichment has also contributed to analytical impreci-
sion. Martin Libicki, a RAND analyst, has identified seven separate cate-
gories represented in the myriad discussions of IW: command and control 
warfare, intelligence-based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological war-
fare, hacker warfare, economic information warfare, and cyberwarfare.25 
that: 
Pinpointing what they call "lnfoWar," Daniel and Julie Ryan argue 
Information warfare is, first and foremost, warfare. It is not information terror-
ism, computer crime, hacking, or commercial or state-sponsored espionage 
using networks for access to desirable information. These are all interesting 
and dangerous phenomena ... in today's connected online world, but they are 
not Info War. Info War is the application of destructive force on a large scale 
against information assets and systems, against the computers and networks 
which support the air traffic control systems, stock transactions, financial rec-
ords, currency exchanges, Internet communications, telephone switching, 
credit records, credit card transactions, the space program, the railroad system, 
the hospital systems that monitor patients and dispense drugs, manufacturing 
process control systems, newspapers and publishing, the insurance industry, 
power distribution and utilities, all of which rely heavily on computers.26 
22Cited in Winn Schwartau, Information Waifare: Protecting Your Personal Security in the 
Electronic Age (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1996), 12. 
23Department of the Air Force, Cornerstones of Information Waifare (Washington, D.C.: De-
partment of the Air Force Headquarters, 1995), 3-4. 
24Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 
October 1998), 1-1. Strictly speaking, IW is 10 conducted during times of crisis and con-
flict in order to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adver-
saries. 
25Martin C. Libicki, What is Information Waifare? (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1995), 91. 
26Daniel J. Ryan and Julie C.H. Ryan, "Protecting the National Information Infrastructure 
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Table 1 
Conventional vs. Information Warfare 
Conventional Warfare Information Warfare 
Battleground Localized and defined General and encompassing 
Combatants Well-marked and limited Anonymous, diffuse, and 
in number potentially numerous 
Targets Typically military assets Anything that uses computers 
(counter-force) or population or information systems 
centers (counter-value); finite 
Offensive advantage Usually the stronger party The weaker party? 
favors 
Investments required Can be prohibitively expensive More affordable? 
Deterrence Stable Unstable? 
While this admonition helps rectify a common sensationalistic im-
pulse to label everything "war," the definition is too restrictive for our 
purposes. This paper instead favors a conception of IW that incorporates 
both this narrow strategic definition and a broader "popular" notion that 
includes "financial crime, intelligence gathering, and terrorist- and state-
based threats"27-as long as these acts are used as pseudo-military means 
to achieve the initiator's political objectives.28 Table 1 provides a stylized 
summary of the contrasts between conventional warfare and information 
warfare. 
Viewed from Alger's and Denning's broad concepts, one could argue 
that human beings have always been concerned with protecting prized in-
against InfoWar," in Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, ed. 
Winn Schwartau (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994), 627. 
27John I. Alger, "Introduction to Information Warfare," in Schwartau, Information Warfare 
(1994), 12. 
28Georgetown University scholar Dorothy E. Denning provides a most general definition of 
information warfare as encompassing "information in any form and transmitted over any 
media, from people and their physical environments to print to telephones to radio and TV 
to computers and computer networks." See Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and 
Security (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 12. 
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formation from adversaries. Denning's illuminating book provides many 
interesting examples of information warfare throughout human history.Z9 
Many label the Persian Gulf War (1991) the first "information war"30 
given that modem information technology played a decisive role. The 
impressive demonstration of U.S. ability to exploit information convinced 
many nations that a direct military confrontation with the United States 
would likely result in defeat. In the 1999 NATO military campaign, the 
Pentagon successfully launched a cyberattack against Serbia. 
The way the United States waged and won these two wars has had a 
profound impact on nations like China. Art Money, U.S. Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for command, control, and intelligence, asserts: "The rest 
of the world realizes that you don't take the U.S. on in a military frontal 
sense, but you can probably bring it down or cause severe damage in a 
more oblique way. And that's where the vulnerability in the U.S. resides."31 
Hence, the interesting paradox of asymmetric conflict continues to intrigue. 
The "Weapon of the Weak" in Asymmetric War? 
One recurring puzzle in international relations is that rather than ac-
cepting an objectionable status quo, the weak often take on the strong, thus 
contravening the canon of deterrence. That such "aberrations" have oc-
curred rather frequently cannot be attributed to either suicidal tendencies 
or luck on the part of the instigators. This seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion needs to be explained. 
Thazha V. Paul's pioneering study compared six cases of war initiated 
by weaker powers and studied the dynamics of asymmetric conflicts. 32 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft's more recent article went further by examining the 
29Ibid., 13-16. 
30 Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 
1992), eloquently explained the rationale for this label. 
31Cited in James Adams, "Virtual Defense," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (May/June 2001): 102. 
32Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts (cited in note 3 above). 
June 2003 117 
ISSUES & STUDIES 
Figure 1 
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conditions under which the weaker powers actually won the war.33 He 
found that among all the asymmetric conflicts from 1800 to 1998, the 
stronger actors won 71 percent of the time whereas the weaker actors won 
the other 29 percent; this result is consistent with conventional wisdom. 
What is surprising, however, is that over time the weaker actors won an 
increasing percentage of asymmetric conflicts. Figure 1 shows how these 
percentages have changed over four fifty-year periods. 
Empirical evidence for the nineteenth century supports the traditional 
IR dictums favoring the strong in asymmetric conflicts: the weaker actors 
won only 11.8 percent of the time for 1800-1849, and 20.5 percent for 
1850-1899. The weaker actors fared much better during the twentieth 
century, however, winning 34.9 percent of all asymmetric conflicts for 
33 Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars" (cited in note 3 above). 
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1900-1949, and 55 percent for 1950-1998. In the most recent period, not 
only were the weaker actors more prone to initiating conflicts than in 
previous periods but they were also more likely to win (with the Vietnam 
War being a prime example). These findings challenge traditional concepts 
of IR and should, moreover, be of considerable interest to countries like 
China. 
Arrenguin-Toft then analyzes the various scenarios under which 
strong states can be defeated by their weaker counterparts. He refers to 
the thinking of Mao Zedong that, when fighting the strong, the weak will 
benefit from a certain combination of direct and indirect approach strate-
gies. Direct approaches aim at dismantling an adversary's ability to fight. 
Indirect approaches aim at destroying the adversary's resolve to fight. He 
postulates that when strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak 
actors defend with an indirect strategy, the weak actor will win. Converse-
ly, when an attack occurs with strong actors using an indirect strategy and 
weak actors using a direct strategy, the weak actor will also win. In short, 
when the approaches of both the stronger and the weaker actors converge, 
the stronger actor is expected to win, but when their approaches diverge, 
the weaker actor is expected to be victorious. 
In both cases the weak actor will come out on top because, either way, 
the intersection of strategies will prove time-consuming for the stronger 
actor while the weaker actor will remain resilient. Underlining this idea is 
the concept of "interest asymmetry" whereby a strong state will be subject 
to the notion of "relative interest"; because the survival of the strong state 
is not at stake, it will be less willing to absorb causalities and other losses, 
while the weak state will make such sacrifices in the name of survival. The 
relative interest gives rise to "relative political vulnerability" whereby do-
mestic forces will require the strong state to withdraw from a situation 
where it is suffering significant losses--even though it may have the su-
perior military resources. His model can be summed up as in Figure 2, with 
the expected winners identified in each cell. 
The above historical record and theoretical exposition both show that 
the notion (and allure) of asymmetric war should not be summarily dis-
missed as fantasy. Viewed from the standpoint of prospect theory in 
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Figure 2 
Predicting Winners 
Weak actor Strong actor 
international relations/4 this analysis shows that the weak actor may over-
estimate expected gains and underestimate losses by engaging in risk-
seeking-rather than risk-averting-behavior. Barry O'Neill cautions 
that countries might be unable to negotiate their way out of a war be-
cause certain kinds of disputes, especially those over symbols or religious 
places, often generate risk-seeking behavior.35 Jeffrey Berejekian also 
finds that states maximize absolute gains whenever possible and always 
guard against external threats to their sovereignty.36 
Given both the highly symbolic value and the nonnegotiable status 
that Taiwan has to the PRC's notion of sovereignty as well as Beijing's 
oft-repeated warning that it will recover Taiwan at any cost/7 the PRC may 
engage in risk-seeking behavior in its military strategy vis-a-vis Taiwan 
34See Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87-112; Jeffrey Berejekian, "The Gains 
Debate: Framing State Choice," American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (December 
1997): 789-805; and Barry O'Neill, "Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory," In-
ternational Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 617-40. For two book-length 
treatments, see Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and 
International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Rose 
McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign 
Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
350'Neill, "Risk Aversion." 
36Berejekian, "The Gains Debate." 
37For example, marking the 80th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Jiang 
Zemin (i.J:if )\)vowed to some one hundred PLA generals that he would personally lead 
the PLA into war, and that China would "pay any price" to force Taiwan into Beijing's fold. 
See "Jiang Pledges to Take Army to War to Liberate Taiwan," Agence France Presse, July 
1, 2001 (accessed via Lexis-Nexus). 
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and the United States--especially if it has such instruments as IW. For 
example, in a veiled threat to destroy U.S. aircraft and ships, prior to the 
PLA's large-scale military exercises on Dongshan Island (At_w ~)in July 
2001-three months after the midair collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3 sur-
veillance plane with a Chinese fighter, the Chinese military warned that 
it reserves "the right to resolutely intercept or drive away foreign or Taiwan 
aircraft or warships conducting reconnaissance. If incoming aircraft or 
warships refuse to heed the warning, the PLA will open fire to bring them 
down or sink them. "38 Hence, deterrence as theory and practice may not 
hold true. 
In the context of information warfare, Rattray points out four condi-
tions that are conducive to the waging of a successful strategic IW:39 
1. Offensive freedom of action: Strategic attacks must be able to get 
through an adversary's defenses and inflict significant damage on 
chosen targets. Hence, capacity to achieve surprise, speed, and 
the ability to sustain the vigor of attacks all work to the advantage 
of the attacker. 
2. Significant vulnerability to attack: The adversary must possess a 
vulnerable center of gravity that can be exploited through direct 
attack, which would erode the political will to fight by destroying 
the ability of the economy to function, or by disabling the adver-
sary's fielded forces. 
I ' 
3. Prospec(s for effective 1retaliation and escalation are minimized: 
A potential attacker must assess its own vulnerability and the 
likelihood that the adversary would retaliate. 
4. Vulnerabilities can be identified and targeted, and damage can be 
assessed. 
38See report by Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, citing a~ arti~le in the July ~001 issu~ of G'!ofi 
zhanwang ( ~ )'f fP<_ !J.. ), published by the Shan ghat In~tJtute of ~nternattonal Studtes. Ctted 
from China Reform Monitor 397 (July 20, 2001), avatlable onhne at <http://www.afpc.org/ 
crrn/crm397.htm>. 
39Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, 99-100. 
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Rattray cautions that these enabling conditions are necessary, but not suffi-
cient, for a successful IW. Nevertheless, they unquestionably constitute the 
elements of any potential serious IW attacker. 
The next section shows how the PRC's IW strategies incorporate 
certain enabling elements in an endeavor to develop "information warfare 
with Chinese characteristics." 
Overcoming the Superior with the Inferior? 
China's keen interests in IW should be understood in the context of its 
security assessment. A Pentagon report states that: 
While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with the United States-
primarily in terms of trade and technology, Beijing apparently believes that the 
United States poses a significant long-term challenge. China's leaders have 
asserted that the United States seeks to maintain a dominant geostrategic posi-
tion by containing the growth of Chinese power... China has adopted an am-
bivalent if not skeptical attitude toward the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region.40 
To spearhead China's military modernization and counter U.S. power, 
Chinese strategists have explored the potential asymmetric applications 
of IW for any future conflict with a technologically superior adversary. 
Although the PRC's current interests in IW appear primarily scholarly, 
the Chinese military has taken a number of important steps in developing 
operational IW capabilities: (1) increasing the amount and complexity of 
10/IW components in several recent exercises; (2) increasing the PLA's 
proficiency in defensive measures, most notably against the threat of com-
puter viruses; and (3) recruiting specialists via the PLA's reserve officer se-
lection program by sponsoring the college education of or offering to repay 
loans after graduation for recruits in return for a military service commit-
ment. The Pentagon report concludes that the PRC has both the capability 
40Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of 
China" (July 12, 2002), 8. 
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to penetrate poorly protected U.S. computer systems and the potential to 
utilize computer network attacks (CNA) to strike specific U.S. civilian and 
military infrastructures.41 
In recent years leading Chinese military journals have published a 
number of interesting publications discussing IW in the context of "asym-
metric warfare. "42 The most notable example is the above-mentioned 
Unrestricted Waifare. In this significant book, the authors propose various 
tactics useful for developing nations like China to compensate for their 
military inferiority vis-a-vis the United States. They argue that a digital 
attack may give China a significant asymmetric advantage and even bring 
about the defeat of the United States.43 
Given the Western domination of the discourse on IW, how do the 
Chinese hope to accomplish these goals? China's approach toward IW 
fits a pattern that is emblematic of many of its previous reform endeavors 
-"to retain Chinese teaching as the root and only use Western teaching 
selectively" ('f."'~ ft iT§"'~ Jf], Zhongxue weiti, Xixue weiyong). In 
other words, China seeks to develop "information warfare with Chinese 
characteristics" by integrating traditional Chinese stratagems into modem 
IW. This strategy poses a challenge to the Western-dominated IW para-
digm. 
The discourse on IW has traditionally been dominated by the West. 
Exemplifying the Western paradigm, the Joint Doctrine for Command and 
Control Warfare (C2W) defines IW as "actions taken to achieve information 
41 Ibid., 31. Admittedly there are other ways to recruit hackers into the PLA, including the 
commercial front companies employed to build the PLA's networks. 
42For a tour d'horizon of the contending perspectives held by Chinese military thinkers on 
that country's future security environment, see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Fu-
ture Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), 
esp. chap. 6. For three pioneering syntheses of these articles on IW, translated into English 
and introduced to the Western audience, seeM. Ehsan Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Per-
spectives on the PRC: New Frontiers oflnformation-Based War," Asian Survey 37, no. 12 
(1997): 1163-81; James C. Mulvenon, "The PLA and Information Warfare," in The Peo-
ple's Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang 
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 175-86; and Timothy Thomas, "China's Electronic 
Strategies," Military Review, May-June 2001, 47-54. 
43Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare. 
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security by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, 
information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's 
own information-based processes, information systems, and computer-
based networks. "44 In practice, however, Western military scholars have 
been chiefly concerned with offensive IW, especially by targeting the ad-
versary's command and control center in an effort to bring about quick 
resolution of war. 
In military parlance, IW is usually considered an integral aspect of a 
larger phenomenon known as the RMA. Not merely about technological 
innovation, RMA also involves the revolutionary impact that technology is 
having on war-fighting concepts, operational techniques, and organiza-
tions. For example, military scholar Andrew Krepinevich writes: 
[A military revolution] occurs when the application of new technologies into a 
significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational 
concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the 
character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase 
---Qften an order of magnitude or greater-in the combat potential and military 
effectiveness of armed forces.45 
In this sense, the Chinese armed forces as an institution are undergoing an 
RMA. The presumed quantum leap in combat effectiveness as a result of 
RMA constitutes a key impetus for China's forays into IW. 
Modern information technology has also created intriguing new pos-
sibilities for offensive IW: 
Operations can take place in an instant and come from anywhere in the world. 
They can be orchestrated and conducted from the comfort of a home or office, 
without the risks of spies and undercover operations, physical break-ins, and 
the handling of explosives. The number of targets that potentially could be 
reached is staggering. Operations could be launched by state or nonstate actors, 
and by individual groups. The cost to the perpetrators might be negligible, the 
losses to the victims immeasurable.46 
44 Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC," 1164. 
45 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," Na-
tional Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 30. 
46Denning, Information Warfare and Security, 17. 
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This quote from IW expert Dorothy Denning shows the ways that IW has 
altered the nature of war in the information age. First, this type of warfare 
introduces the intriguing possibility of asymmetric warfare, wherein a 
weaker actor-in lieu of attacking the stronger party directly--can focus its 
attack on where the strong party is vulnerable, and is thus able to prevail. 
The notion of "overcoming the superior with the inferior" resonates with 
the Chinese, who can draw such inspirations from their rich military his-
tory, including Sun Tzu's adage of"winning the battle without fighting" and 
Mao's "people's war" doctrine. Rather than being obsolete, these tradi-
tional stratagems are resurrected to give the Chinese an edge in developing 
"IW with Chinese characteristics." 
Second, IW is quintessentially a form of "unconventional" or "ir-
regular" war. It eschews taking the form of mass armies engaging one 
another on the battlefield.47 The anonymity of attackers, the omnipresence 
of battlefields, the lopsided advantage favoring offense over defense, and 
the attack that is both of shorter duration and can be automated all make 
IW a curious weapon of choice by the weak, one that seemingly involves 
little cost but promises to offer substantial benefit.48 
For example, Unrestricted Warfare promotes expanding combat be-
yond the battlefield to include such other facets as computer warfare, inter-
national terrorism, biological and ch~mical warfare, and economic and fi-
nancial warfare.49 Affirming IW's unconventional character, the book con-
cludes: 
[I]t is precisely the diversity of the means employed that has enlarged the con-
cept of warfare ... [T]he enlargement of the concept of warfare has, in tum, re-
47For an overview of the changing character of warfare, see Martin Van Creveld, The Trans-
formation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). 
48 As articulated by Denning, "Funding a conventional military is not cheap. A single jet can 
cost a hundred million dollars or more. Then there are ships, tanks, spy satellites, and huge 
armed forces. By comparison, $1 million to $10 million would amply fund a highly paid 
IW team of ten to twenty hackers using state-of-the-art computers. The hacking tools 
themselves can be downloaded without cost from Internet sites all over the world." See 
Denning, Information Waifare and Security, 17. 
49 A caveat is in order: some of the recommendations in this volume, such as state-sponsored 
terrorism, are fundamentally at odds with the PRC's stated policy. 
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suited in enlargement of the realm of war-related activities .... The battlefield is 
next to you and the enemy is on the network. Only there is no smell of gun-
powder or the odor of blood .... [W]arfare is in the process of transcending the 
domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly be-
coming a matter for politicians, scientists, and even bankers. 50 
The PRC is interested not in IW per se, but in the strategic and polit-
ical utility of IW. This holistic approach stems from China's perception of 
the post-Cold War security environment. China views this U.S.-dominated 
order (or what Beijing derides as U.S. "hegemonism" and "unilateralism") 
as threatening the PRC's security interests. 51 
Viewed from power transition theory, today's China-which is ex-
periencing rapid growth and dissatisfied with the existing world order-
displays characteristics of an anti-status quo power. A disgruntled rising 
power may see new technologies, such as IW, as presenting an opportunity 
to rectify its own disadvantageous security status. This scenario has a 
negative impact on systemic stability. 52 
Faced with the seemingly invulnerable U.S. military power, smaller 
and weaker actors have striven to find ways to identify and then penetrate 
weaknesses in American defense through asymmetric warfare. In this 
regard, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States constitute 
a form of asymmetric "warfare." IW can be a logical weapon of choice 
for asymmetric warfare, as such an attack can have a crippling effect on 
multiple operations and can be undertaken by a militarily and economically 
disadvantaged state or even by a nonstate actor. 
Striving to achieve greater power and prominence on the world stage, 
the PRC seeks to develop asymmetric IW as a compensation for its inferior 
50Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Waifare, quoted in Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the 
People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regency, 2000), 16. 
51 The Bush administration's "National Security Strategy" of September 2002 unequivocally 
states that the United States would use its "position of unparalleled military strength and 
great economic and political influence" to actively work to "bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every comer of the world." This document is 
available online at <http://www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>. 
52See Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New 
York: Chatham House, 2000); and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for 
Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33. 
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military strength vis-a-vis the United States. True, China almost certainly 
has the ability to damage inadequately protected U.S. information net-
works, as pointed out above. The more important question, however, is 
whether it can use IW as a realistic military option to overcome a superior 
adversary and still preserve the fruits of its prized economic development, 
which will surely be destroyed in a retaliation by the adversary. China must 
think unconventionally about winning the war without fighting, the focus 
of the next section. 
Winning the War without Fighting? 
The PLA has come a long way from its revolutionary days in terms 
of its force structure and doctrines, reflecting its changing security environ-
ment and China's changing national priorities. 5~ Moving away from "peo-
ple's war," which sought to compensate for technological deficiencies by 
pure numerical strength, the PLA's current emphasis is to develop capabili-
ties to fight a "high-tech war" by concentrating on select "pockets of ex-
cellence," such as missile and electronic warfare units. IW holds special 
appeal because many in the PLA count on this strategy to bypass or over-
come well-known deficiencies. 
Paul Godwin, a PLA expert, asserts that a persistent "doctrine-capa-
bility gap" exists for the PLA. He dismisses as obsolete the vast majority 
of China's ships and aircraft: "They are simply not capable of conducting 
the kind of war their doctrine envisions: a short, high-intensity conflict 
fought for limited political objectives within a confined theatre of opera-
tions."54 
53For a useful overview of the PLA's evolution since 1978, see Dennis Blasko, "PLA Force 
Structure: A 20-Year Retrospective," in Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on 
Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. 
Yang (Santa Monica: RAND, 200 I), 51-58. 
54Paul H.B. Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese 
People's Liberation Army: 1978-1999," in Mulvenon and Yang, Seeking Truth from Facts, 
114. 
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Despite IW's enduring allure for "overcoming the superior with the 
inferior," implementation is difficult. A PLA paper states that utilization 
of IW depends not only on sophisticated technology, but also on the inte-
grative use of networked information processes. The central role of in-
formation has moved the armed forces toward becoming a network-based 
organization, integrating the entire military system so that its arms and 
services can interlink and interact seamlessly. Joint operations, network 
warfare, and information warfare all are mutually supportive, having tre-
mendous positive-and negative-impacts on the military capabilities of 
stronger states. 55 
Networked IW represents an intriguing progress whereby moves 
toward information systems and networks are not only advantageous but 
increasingly necessary for stronger states. While network-based opera-
tions enable enhanced coordination of skilled attacks, a dependence on in-
formation can leave the military vulnerable to attacks of its information 
base, leaving its divisions disintegrated and helpless. Thus strong Ameri-
can information knowledge also exposes a potentially weak side to a deter-
mined and increasingly sophisticated adversary. 56 
The Chinese hope to exploit these paradoxes in developing IW in a 
way that attains Sun Tzu's highest stage of "subduing the enemy without 
fighting" (;f-~r?ii.hiLA..-Z*, buzhan er qu ren zhi bing). As an example, 
PLA scholar Su Enze notes that the further information technology de-
velops, the more easily technology can be caught up to, and "the more fun-
gible and vulnerable the information technology becomes. "57 Su's thinking 
correctly implies that such ironies might be good news for those developing 
countries seeking shortcuts to technological development. 
55Fang Fenghui, "Grasp the Characteristics of Joint Operations Pertaining to the Time," 
Jiefangjun baa (Liberation Army Daily) (Beijing) (Internet version), June 5, 2001, trans-
lated as "Article on Characteristics of Military Joint Operations in Information Age," FBIS 
Daily Report: China (Document no.: FBIS-CHI-2001-0605). 
56Ironically, as the Chinese C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) system becomes more modernized and comput-
erized, the PRC may also become more vulnerable to American IW methods. 
57Su Enze, "Logical Concept of Information Warfare," FBIS Daily Report: China, June 6, 
1996, cited in Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC," 1168-69. 
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As diffusion of information technology continues apace, American 
resource advantages in securing information and information systems may 
gradually erode in relative terms, thus giving rise to hypothetical "windows 
of opportunity" wherein the field for offense-defense calculation appears 
temporarily leveled. Recently a PLA author postulated that the advantage 
is tilting toward the weaker offensive party: 
Information warfare is an all-directional, three-dimensional confrontation. "In 
offensive, it can infiltrate into every nook and cranny; and in defense, it can stop 
the infiltration of even one tiny drop of water." In this context, the confronta-
tion between the offensive and the defensive parties are "asymmetrical," and 
the cost of a reliable defensive system is a lot more than the cost that the offen-
sive side would pay. 58 
The last line evokes similar arguments against missile defense sys-
tems: they are expensive and ineffective. However, the author also stresses 
the importance of defensive IW-which is consistent with Sun Tzu's 
dictum "knowing the enemy and yourself, you can fight a hundred battles 
and win them all" (j;p C,};P4lt a~ a$-, zhiji zhibi, baizhan baisheng): "In 
information warfare, not only must we 'know ourselves and the enemy,' 
we must, more importantly, make sure that the 'enemy does not have 
knowledge about us,' and use our knowledge about the enemy to attack the 
enemy that does not have knowledge about us."59 
Early Chinese IW discourse was dominated by a focus on the asym-
metric advantages that offensive IW presumably gave to the weaker party; 
recent scholarship on China's underdeveloped IW defense has, however, 
revealed a gradual maturation of China's IW discourse. Nonetheless, cer-
tain concepts of earlier scholarship that focus on gaps (theorized or real) in 
America's information systems have endured. 
The goal of U.S. joint operations (i.e., networking its military around 
information systems) is the comprehensive integration of units for all mili-
58Tang Chaojing, "Information Security Plays a Decisive Role i~ Military Struggles," 
Jiefangjun baa (Internet version), July 17, 2002, translated as "Art1cle Underscores Infor-
mation Security in Information Warfare," FBIS Daily Report: China (Document no.: FBIS-
CHI-2002-0718). 
59Ibid. 
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tary purposes. By contrast, the goal of Chinese joint operations is the con-
centration of "capabilities" in a certain direction or zone, with the intention 
of creating superiority over the enemy in a specific area at a specific time. 
In an information attack, the PRC hopes to wage asymmetric warfare by 
crippling a stronger military (e.g., the United States) through the identifi-
cation and penetration of a gap in the adversary's network and hence over-
come the enemy's superior might. 60 
Rather than futilely attempting to match the adversary's compre-
hensive strength, the Chinese concentrate on exploiting the adversary's 
weaknesses. PLA joint operations aim to control and prevent the enemy's 
concentration of joint operations by attacking the enemy's information 
systems through false or deceptive moves. Such a strategy is aimed at de-
stroying the enemy's capacity to make a decision, leaving the disorganized 
enemy to be a "host of dragons without a head" ( ;«f -tt #, it, qunlong 
wushou).61 The Chinese model inspires weak states to explore asymmetric 
warfare instead of competing directly with strong states. 
Michael Pillsbury, an expert on the Chinese military, notes that China 
is developing other possibilities for asymmetric warfare-the attainment of 
long-range precision interception weapons, the use of unused frequencies 
in civilian television and radio broadcasting for information communica-
tion, the utilization of encryption-based codes to prevent information 
stealing, the use of space and satellites to obtain intelligence, the use of 
saturated tactical ballistic missiles, the development of a directional in-
frared jamming system, and so on. Chinese military literature also calls 
for a strategic "reconnaissance" and warning system, a battlefield informa-
tion network for the promotion of joint operations to better implement 
asymmetric warfare, and long-range, precision strike systems.62 
60Thomas, "China's Electronic Strategies" and Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives 
on the PRC" (both cited in note 42 above). 
61 Liu Jun and Zhou Ruhong, "How to Concentrate 'Capability' in Joint Operations," Jiefang-
jun bao (Internet version), June 12, 200 I, translated as "PRC Army Paper on Concentrating 
'Capability' in Joint Operations," FB/S Daily Report: China (Document no.: FBIS-CHI-
2001-0612). 
62For more details, see Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, chap. 6. 
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Asymmetric warfare's potential for "subduing the enemy without 
fighting" intrigues Chinese strategic thinkers. Unlike a traditional, attri-
tion-style war involving battlefield casualties and conquest, a properly 
executed strategic IW campaign may severely undermine an adversary's 
ability and willingness to fight. Targets of asymmetric attack can include 
electrical power grids, civilian aviation systems, transportation networks, 
seaports and shipping, highways, and television broadcast systems. 
Developing IW also dovetails with China's grand strategy of national 
development. Since 1978 Chinese leaders have been pursuing a fundamen-
tal national strategy that seeks to elevate China's overall national power 
by focusing on economic development. Proponents contend that IW may 
permit China to compete with the United States militarily, without sacrific-
ing resources designated for economic growth. IW is thus key to China's 
quest for greatness-on the cheap. 
Liu Huaqing (~•J-f"~t), the architect ofthe PLA's modernization, de-
clared at a COSTIND (Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry 
for National Defense) national conference in 1995 that: 
Information warfare and electronic warfare are of key importance, while fight-
ing on the ground can only serve to exploit the victory. Hence, China is more 
convinced [than ever] that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolution 
with iriformation warfare as the core has reached the stage where efforts must 
be made to catch up with and overtake rivals.63 
The concept of "overcoming the superior with the inferior" is deeply 
ingrained in the ethos/mythology of the CCP. Since its revolutionary years, 
the CCP has had to overcome stronger rivals like the Kuomintang (during 
the Chinese civil war), the United States (the Korean War), and the Soviet 
Union (the Sino-Soviet border war). In the past, the PLA made up for a 
lack of firepower or manpower with superb unconventional or nonmilitary 
strategies-including guerrilla warfare, psychological trickery, political 
propaganda, and united fronts. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, 
however, the PLA feels the need to harness high technology in its struggle 
against its most probable and powerful strategic rival, the United States. In 
63Quoted in Mulvenon, "The PLA and Information Warfare," 179. Emphasis added. 
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developing IW, the Chinese seek to overcome technological deficiencies 
with superior strategies. 
The Persian Gulf War served as a catalyst for the PLA's IW develop-
ment. Top PLA brass were impressed by superior American technology as 
well as the destructive power of U.S. joint operations that was created 
through the "synergy" of multi-service actions, including simultaneous 
attacks from air force and navy aircrafts, army attack helicopters, and navy 
strike missiles. In the Gulf War, IW played a key part in helping American 
military to blind, deafen, and destroy Iraqi forces. 
PLA generals realized that the PLA's "people's war" force structure 
and military doctrine had become anachronistic. They thus have sought 
to rapidly modernize the military. However, the path they have taken has 
been fraught with challenges. 
Under Deng Xiaoping's ( ~ '1' +) reform programs, military modern-
ization was designated as the last of the Four Modernizations. Consequent-
ly, PLA modernization in the late 1970s-early 1990s achieved only modest 
success, largely due to budgetary limitations. 
However, the demise ofthe Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, 
and China's double-digit growth rate in the 1990s have allowed China 
to substantially increase its military spending and to use its new wealth 
to acquire advanced weapons and technologies.64 The PLA is following 
Deng's advice to develop "selective pockets of excellence."65 Consequent-
ly, IW is playing a very important role in this strategic view of military 
modernization. 
64 Ascertaining the true figures of China's defense expenditure is a matter of considerable de-
bate. In March 2002, Chinese Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng ( .:<Jl ·~"iii) announced that 
China was increasing military spending in 2002 by 17.6 percent, or US$3 billion, bringing 
the publicly reported total to US$20 billion. However, the publicly disclosed figures do not 
include major spending for weapons research and foreign arms purchases. A Pentagon re-
port estimates that China's actual military spending could total US$65 billion, making 
China the second largest defense spender in the world after the United States and the largest 
defense spender in Asia. See Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military 
Power of the People's Republic of China" (July 12, 2002), 38. The report illustrates the 
various ways that China has concealed most of its defense modernization spending outside 
the PLA budget. 
65Thomas, "China's Electronic Strategies," 48. 
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As an example of retooling, China has now given its vast 1.5 million-
strong reserve force, which in the past was charged with supporting PLA 
forces in defense against any foreign intervention, with an IW /IO mission. 
To answer Jiang Zemin's 1991 call for building common telecom systems 
for both military and civilian use, China's reserve telecom regiments have 
become the high-tech link under the country's "people's war" theory. 66 
Ideas for uniting a "people's war" with IW are finding fertile ground in 
China's reserve force. Several IW reserve forces have already been formed 
in Datong (kM), Xiamen (J!r,), Shanghai (J:.iB}), Echeng (~:lA), and 
Xi'an ( & * ). Each is developing its own specialty. Shanghai reserve 
forces, for example, focus on wireless telecom networks and double-
encryption passwords. 67 
East vs. West 
If the Chinese IW strategy is not a mere duplication of the Western 
model, is it an alternative-and superior-strategy? Western and Chinese 
understandings of information as a mechanism of war vary greatly. 
Despite their awe at the American success with the execution of high 
technology and joint operations during the Gulf War, top PLA generals 
have resolved not to duplicate American IW; they have instead sought to 
develop "information warfare with Chinese characteristics." 
Summarizing several important Chinese sources on IW, a website 
maintained by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council offers a good introduc-
tion to Chinese thinking on IW: 
The so-called information warfare refers to the struggle waged by two opposing 
sides over the right to acquire, control, and use information .. Such struggles re-
66See Zhang Fuyou, "With Joint Efforts Made by Army and People, Military Telecommuni-
cations Makes Leap Forward," Jiefangjun bao, Septel!lber 9, 2000. Translated by FBIS, 
available online at <http://sun3.1ib/uci.edu/-scla/microfonn/resources/f-g/f_ 049.htm>, 
quoted in Thomas, "China's Electronic Strategies," 47-48. 
67Ibid. 
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volve around the three basic clusters in the process ofinfonnation transmission: 
the source of infonnation, the passage of infonnation, and the recipient of in-
fonnation .... As a broad definition, IW is the use of infonnation technology and 
methods by the two opposing sides in the political, economic, technological, 
and military spheres to fight and struggle for an infonnation edge. Viewed from 
a narrow military standpoint, the contents of IW include the use of both infor-
mation technology and methods in such military actions as exploring, spying, 
guidance, command, control, communication, infonnation processing, camou-
flage and trickery, and strike and killing; military actions aimed to spy on, 
interfere, destroy, and counter-utilize such actions by the enemy; and counter-
measures against the enemy's spying, interference, destruction, and counter-
utilization .... The PRC began in the mid-1980s to develop capabilities for next-
generation war-called "dianxue zhanzheng" (!.!;*-~-f) or "pinpoint attack" 
internally, or "infonnation warfare" ( 11; ,~!f(, xinxi zhan) from the outside.68 
The above quote shows that whereas the Western paradigm views in-
formation warfare as a series of combat actions taken to attack the enemy's 
systems of information while preserving one's own information and infor-
mation systems, the Chinese adopt a more encompassing interpretation of 
IW, which touches upon the offensive and defensive nature of peacetime, 
crisis, and war operations, as well as national, strategic, and tactical levels 
of wartime form. 
Western military scholars are concerned with offensive information 
warfare as it relates to the enemy's command and control center. Chinese 
authors include elements of electronic, psychological, virtual, and eco-
nomic warfare, as well as even CNN coverage and the destabilization of 
68
"Xinxi zhan ji chaoxian zhan de hanyi tezheng" (Definitions and characteristics of infor-
mation warfare and unrestricted warfare), available online at <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ 
rpir/2ndl_f.htm>. The concept of "dianxue zhan" (11; *-~), sometimes unsatisfactorily 
translated as "acupuncture war," is a metaphor from many "wuxia" (il\1:k., or gongfu :~-)J ;!<;.) 
films or novels, in which certain individuals specialize in finding the critical vulnerable 
"xuedao" (*-It, center of gravity) of the enemy, striking it with a bare finger and causing 
the enemy to become temporarily paralyzed or lose all his powers. As such, the concept of 
"dianxue zhan" has semblance in the English expression "striking the (almighty enemy's) 
Achilles' heel." Hence, it is consistent with the notion of asymmetric warfare. The sources 
used by this website include: "Gaojishu tiaojian xia de xinxi zhan" (lnfonnation war-
fare under high-tech conditions); "Xin zhanzheng lun" (New theories on war); "Chaoxian 
zhan: Dui quanqiuhua shidai zhanzheng yu zhanfa de xiangding" (Unrestricted warfare: 
Thoughts on war and art of war in the globalization era); and "Heba: Toushi kuashiji 
Zhonggong wuli zhuanwen: Dianxue zhan (zixun/xinxi zhan)" (Nuclear hegemon: Thor-
ough investigation into the PRC's military forces in the new century: Entries on acupunc-
ture war [infonnation war]). 
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financial institutions. 69 The Chinese definition of military science involves 
not only military operational art but also specific approaches broadly in-
cluded in military art, such as psychological trickery and stratagems. West-
em theorists view information as a weapon to be used sparingly and as 
a mechanism to preserve more conservative structures. Chinese authors in-
terpret information warfare as an equalizer through the use of asymmetric 
and broad-reaching techniques. 
Although Chinese concepts of information warfare borrow from the 
Western idea of information dominance, their methods for achieving infor-
mation dominance differ. Strategy is important in information warfare. 
The Chinese see the application of certain ancient stratagems as a way to 
possess a superior ability to execute strategy and to develop a more com-
plementary military doctrine for force modemization.70 
It is hard for many to "think outside the box" and realize that America's 
comprehensive strengths may actually become its weaknesses. This irony, 
however, is not lost on America's detractors who are seeking to develop 
isolated "pockets of excellence" and use strategizing to humble the world's 
surviving superpower. Rather than trying to "catch up" or replicate Ameri-
can methods of information warfare, Chinese IW doctrine emphasizes 
deception and strategizing-lessons that the American military may take 
from China on how to exploit this new system of warfare. Through the rise 
of information warfare, America's comprehensive strength can be a weak-
ness and China's comprehensive weakness may become its strength; this is 
the type of paradox Chinese military officials have long recognized and 
sought to exploit. 
Although the United States demonstrated its IW prowess in the Gulf 
War, its military strategy is not flawless. As information weapons and tech-
69 Ahrari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC," 1164. 
7
°Chinese IW strategies revitalize the execution of the classic Thirty-Six Strategies: The 
Secret Art of War. Timothy Thomas, an American military analyst, argues that there are 
clear IW connections to the first five strategies-in which information creates an environ-
ment of anonymity, ambiguity, and the chaos/confusion of ethical retaliation-that the 
Chinese have long dominated traditionally. See Thomas, ·:china's. El~ctron!c Strategies." 
An English translation of the Thirty-Six Strategies of ancient Chma ts onlme at <http:// 
www.chinastrategies.com>. 
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nologies drive joint operations, such network-based information systems 
become highly vulnerable to asymmetric attack. While U.S. strength lies 
in technological and strategic mechanisms for information, their move-
ments leave significant network gaps open for asymmetric attack, granting 
the PRC space to exercise its strong suit-asymmetric tactics. 
The PRC has more experience (and success) with asymmetric warfare 
than the United States. While the United States currently leads the PRC 
in information technologies and resources, the potential threat from the 
PRC cannot be dismissed. Chinese military history celebrates techniques 
of asymmetric warfare, and the Chinese interpretation of warfare is also 
far more encompassing than a traditional Western view. This entails a 
potentially far greater scope of destruction-entering the private, civilian 
spheres as well. While waging IW against the United States may still be 
many years off, the PRC has shown keen interest in integrating IW in its 
overall military strategy vis-a-vis Taiwan. 
The New Factor in Cross-Strait Military Calculus 
The advent of IW has introduced a new element into the cross-Strait 
military situation by presenting China with a potentially credible military 
option vis-a-vis Taiwan. 
A Pentagon report states that despite Beijing's professed commitment 
to a peaceful unification with Taiwan, the Chinese leadership has shown 
an increasing willingness to consider the use of force to achieve unifica-
tion. The report surmises that "Beijing's primary political objective in 
any Taiwan-related crisis ... likely would be to compel Taiwan authorities 
to enter into negotiations on Beijing's terms and to undertake operations 
with enough rapidity to preclude third-party intervention. "71 The report 
also seems to concur with the view of some analysts that the PLA's of-
71 Department of Defense, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of 
China" (July 12, 2002), 46. 
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fensive capabilities improve as each year passes, providing Beijing with 
an increasing number of credible options to intimidate or actually attack 
Taiwan. 72 With the exception of ballistic missiles, IW seems the most 
promising option for achieving Beijing's political objectives. Indeed, the 
PRC has made considerable efforts toward making IW a real option. 
Certain PLA officers have promoted IW as an effective weapon to 
subdue Taiwan and to deter possible American intervention. Articles 
written by several strategists at the Jinan Military Region (~ rf1 .f. );if), 
collected in a volume on IW published by the PLA's National Defense Uni-
versity Press in 1999, discussed the roles ofiW in a combined amphibious 
battle. They illustrated the main forms that IW can be waged under such a 
campaign: 73 
1. Command and control war: To degrade and destroy the enemy's 
anti-landing command and control systems. 
2. Intelligence war: To acquire the intelligence needed for a suc-
cessful amphibious campaign will take place in all domains, in-
cluding land, sea, sky, space, and electromagnetics. 
3. Network war: To gain control and damage the enemy's computer 
network systems by adhering to three priorities: (a) comprehen-
sively paralyzing the enemy's network systems; (b) flexibly 
employing attack methods; and (c) training and using "cyber-
warriors" (hackers), including the establishment of a special cyber-
force with expertise in computer know-how and advanced decod-
ing techniques. 
4. Communication war: To destroy the "nerve" of the enemy's com-
mand and control systems; and 
72Ibid., 47. Representing this view is David Shambaugh, "A Matter ~fTime: Taiwan's Erod-
ing Military Advantage," The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Spnng 2000): 119-33. 
73Liu Yuhua eta!., "Lianhe dengdao zhanyi xi~xi zuozh.an wenti y~njiu" ~A st_ud~ on the in~ 
formation warfare issues involved in a combmed landmg battle), tn Wo;un xinxizhan went1 
yanjiu (A study on the issues of our military's information warfare) (Beijing: National De-
fense University Press, 1999), 209-16. 
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5. Electronic war:. To weaken and destroy the enemy's electronic 
equipmenC 
The Chinese military has begun to put these ideas into practice. In 
the summer of 2001, the PLA for the first time began the war game ex-
ercises in the Taiwan Strait with information warfare aimed at electroni-
cally paralyzing enemy communications and command systems. Also for 
the first time, a new electronic warfare unit was deployed over the Strait,14 
In exercises the following year, the PLA incorporated even more sophisti-
cated items of 10/IW. 
In sum, the PLA seeks to gain information domination in any conflict 
with Taiwan by attacking Taiwan's information networks and command 
and control centers, as well as by conducting propaganda and political 
warfare. The purpose is to incorporate Taiwan by "subduing the enemy 
without actually fighting" a la Sun Tzu, and by denying possible American 
military intervention. 
This trend presents a new challenge to Taiwan and U.S. defense of-
ficials. Most analysts have hitherto: (1) dismissed Chinese invasion threat 
due to the high threshold for success (due to logistical difficulties, Taiwan-
ese resistance, and international intervention); (2) argued that Taiwan's 
smaller military can maintain a qualitative edge until at least 2005; (3) 
questioned whether Beijing has realistic military options vis-a-vis Taiwan 
despite both the PRC's consistent refusal to renounce the use of force and 
occasional saber-rattling against Taiwan; and (4) held that a probable, al-
beit not guaranteed, U.S. military intervention (in the case of an unpro-
voked attack on Taiwan) serves to deter Beijing-i.e., the so-called policy 
of strategic ambiguity. 
From the Chinese standpoint, IW seems to have lowered the threshold 
for a likely successful military campaign against Taiwan and increased the 
utility of an offensive strategy. IW seems to hold promise for "winning the 
74Craig S. Smith, "Beijing Stages War Games, Mostly for Taiwan," The New York Times, 
July 10,2001, A6; and Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "'Information Warfare' Changes Taiwan 
Equation," The Washington Times, July 13, 2001, Al8. 
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battle without fighting" (Sun Tzu's adage) and "overcoming the superior 
with the inferior" (Mao's guerrilla strategy). Properly executed IW may-
along with such other coercive weapons as missile strikes and a naval 
blockade-help bring Taiwan to its knees and deny American intervention. 
Such perceptions may cloud decision-making and make China more likely 
to use force. The application of information technology in international 
conflicts such as cross-Strait tensions may thus result in more instability. 
Curiously enough, however, some sort of deterrence is emerging in 
the field of IW. The perceived advantage IW has in terms of offense will 
only hold true if the adversary fails to take proper countermeasures to aug-
ment its own offensive and defensive IW capabilities. For example, after 
then-President Lee Teng-hui ( 4':1t-'*f) stated his "state-to-state" theory in 
July 1999, hundreds of Chinese hackers attacked Taiwanese web servers-
which in turn led to retaliation by Taiwanese hackers. 
After the midair collision between an American Navy EP-3 plane 
and a Chinese fighter in April2001, a self-styled Honker's Union75 utilized 
modern information technology via their website, e-mail system, and down-
loadable viruses to recruit fellow patriots in a "people's war" against the 
United States by attacking thousands of American websites. Their attacks 
triggered a furious retaliation by hHckers based in the United States.76 
These early glimpses into cr0ss-Strait "cyberwar" show that in IW, 
the emphasis on the advantage of offense should be balanced by reflection 
on the importance of defense. At least for now, the PRC cannot launch IW 
without suffering reprisal. Hence, a curious digital "mutual assured de-
struction" (MAD) is emerging. State-sponsored hacking is unlikely to 
fundamentally alter the international power structure. Indeed, the Chinese 
government in May 2002 asked private hackers not to repeat the deface-
ment of U.S. government websites that had occurred a year ago, according 
75The group's name in Chinese means "Red hackers" Ur.i:, hongke), indicating the political 
motives for their actions. 
76For more details on these two episodes, see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang and Gwendolyn 
Stamper, "Asymmetric War? Implications of China's Information Warfare Strategies," 
American Asian Review 20, no. 4 (December 2002): 199-202. 
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to Air Force Major General John Bradley, deputy commander of the Pen-
t~gon's Joint Task Force on Computer Network Operations.77 This shows 
a sobering of China's IW endeavor. 
To counter China's IW development, Taiwan has undertaken its own 
forays into IW. In the summer of 2001, Taiwan's military established its 
own electronic-warfare unit.78 In June 2002, Taiwan for the first time in-
corporated a new facet into its decades-old Wan'an (~~)air-raid drill to 
boost the island's Internet defenses against hacker attacks, especially from 
China.79 A White Paper released by Taiwan's Defense Ministry in July 
2002 states that a three-pronged defense strategy was envisaged in the face 
of increasing threats from China's military satellites, ballistic missile tech-
nology, and information warfare: (I) to prevent war by building a sustain-
able defense capability so that "the enemy dare not rashly wage a war"; (2) 
to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait through dialogue between the two 
sides on security issues; and (3) to ensure the island is ready to defend itself 
in the event of an invasion. 80 
The White Paper notes China's expanding military power-including 
the PLA's efforts to acquire capabilities related to space, electronic, infor-
mation, and precision attack warfare-which would enable the Chinese 
military to conduct a first strike against Taiwan. In response, the White 
Paper calls for Taiwan to build a "compact but delicate, highly capable" 
modern force by reducing the number yet increasing the quality of person-
nel and strengthening technological capability. Included in the deterrence 
strategy are: establishing an early warning system, building offensive and 
defensive capabilities to conduct information and electronic operations, 
77Cited in Pamela Hess, "China Prevented Repeat Cyber Attack on U.S.," UPI, October 29, 
2002, from The Washington Times ( <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20021 029-
121924-51 Olrhtm>). 
78Brian Hsu, "Army Forms Its First Electronic-Warfare Unit," Taipei Times, July 31,2001, 
available online at <http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/200 1/07 /31/print/0000096461 >. 
79
"Web 'Drill' to Tackle Hackers," The Australian, April 30, 2002, C2 (from AFP wire) (ac-
cessed via Lexis-Nexus). 
80Goh Sui Noi, "Taiwan's Strategy: To Deter and Build Trust; a White Paper Outlines the 
Island's Strategy to Build 'Sustainable Defense' to Prevent a Possible Invasion by China," 
The Straits Times, July 24, 2002 (accessed via Lexis-Nexus). 
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and maintaining air superiority and naval dominance. 
The PRC's IW development has introduced uncertainties and risks 
into this volatile region that cannot be overcome until a stable "digital 
MAD" of some sort is established in the Taiwan Strait. This is a case of 
how technology, combined with intentions and (mis-)perceptions, may 
become a destabilizing factor. IW may tempt PLA commanders to launch 
a preemptive strike. China's design for Taiwan is most likely to be a short, 
decisive blow that results in Taipei's capitulation: i.e., a fait accompli pre-
sented to the international community. This is much preferred by Beijing 
to a protracted campaign, such as an amphibious invasion or embargo that 
could invite an uncertain response from other actors. IW appears especial-
ly attractive in this regard, promising both a quick resolution of the military 
contingency and a low casualty rate, so as to preserve Taiwan's industrial 
and commercial assets for Beijing. 
An Emergent Threat? 
How seriously should Taiwan and American defense planners take 
the PRC's IW endeavors? There is no question that the Chinese military is 
keenly interested in studying IW. At the present moment the PLA's interest 
is primarily academic; its IW capabilities are far from operational (weapon-
ized). One can safely say that at the present time the modernization of the 
Chinese armed forces has lagged behind doctrinal development. 
Nevertheless, China's IW forays will benefit from two factors-one 
old and one new. Historically, China has more than once surprised Western 
analysts by indigenously developing weapons systems that the West tried 
hard to deny to China (e.g., atomic bombs in 1964 and nuclear warhead 
miniaturization technology in 1999). Prudence thus cautions against dis-
missing the possibility that China may succeed in developing "IW with 
Chinese characteristics." Whether a modem IW doctrine guided by proven 
historical stratagems will surpass the Western model remains to be seen, 
however. 
Most importantly, the future of China's IW development hinges on 
June 2003 141 
ISSUES & STUDIES 
Table 2 
Growth of Online Populations in Select Countries 
Unit: Millions 
China Taiwan India Japan u.s. 
1997 0.2 1.1 0.2 10.0 56.0 
(June 1997) (Nov. 1997) (Oct. 1997) (Nov. 1997) 
1998 1.5 2.8 0.5 14.0 73.0 
(Sep. 1998) (Nov. 1998) (Oct. 1998) (Oct. 1998) 
1999 7.0 4.8 0.8 19.5 106.3 
(May 1999) (July 1999) 
2000 22.5 6.4 5.0 47.1 164.4 
(July 2000) 
2001 26.5 11.6 7.0 49.4 166.1 
(July 2001) (July 2001) (Jan. 2001) (Aug. 2001) 
2002 45.8 NIA NIA 56.0 165.8 
(July 2002) (June 2002) (April 2002) 
% of population 3.58% 51.8% 0.67% 44.1% 59.10% 
(latest figures) 
Ranking among 51 34 56 35 11 
62 countries 
Note: Year-end figures, unless otherwise noted. 
Sources: "NUA Internet: How Many Online," at <http://www.nua.com/surveys!how_ 
many_ online/asia.html> and <http:l/www.nua.com/surveys!how many online/n america. 
html>; and "Measuring Globalization: Who's Up, Who's Down," Foreign Policy, January/ 
February 2003, 65. 
the country's economic ascendancy in general and its rise as a major global 
IT player in particular. Thanks in large measure to investments by Tai-
wanese IT firms on the mainland, the PRC has recently overtaken Taiwan 
as the world's third largest IT hardware producer and is poised to overtake 
Japan in the next decade if current growth trends continue. In addition, 
China's online population is experiencing exponential growth: from 
200,000 in 1997, to 16.9 million in July 2000, and to 45.8 million in July 
2002, making China one of the largest and fastest-growing Internet mar-
kets.81 Table 2 shows the low base and fast growth of China's online popu-
81
"NUA Internet: How Many Online," at <http:l/www.nua.ie/surveys!how_many_online/ 
asia.html>. 
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lation, in comparison with select countries. 
It should be noted that viewed from another measure of information 
power-Internet penetration rate (i.e., online population as a percentage of 
total population), China remains sparsely wired. As of July 2002, only 3.58 
percent of its population was online, up from 0.00 l percent six years ago. 
Compared to the United States, Japan, and even Taiwan, China clearly has 
a long way to go before it can claim to be a true information power. Table 
2 also shows that on the Globalization Index compiled by Foreign Policy 
and A. T. Kearney, 82 China also pales in comparison, edging out only India. 
China's mixed record as an IT society in an increasingly globalized 
economy-i.e., being a giant in absolute terms and with tremendous upside 
potential, while also being a dwarf in relative terms-will affect the degree 
of success of China's further inroads in IW. The PLA's immersion in both 
IW and RMA is understandable. However, it is hard to imagine a superb 
IW fighting force detached from a society characterized by relatively low 
technology and connectivity. 83 A strong IT base gives rise to a strong IW 
capability. The PLA may thus continue facing difficulties in surmounting 
the military's acknowledged doctrinal-capability gap. 
The flip side of this argument is that Taiwan's security depends on a 
strong and continuously improving IT sector. This is because the IT sector 
has vital links to other sectors and is vital to overall economic development. 
A second factor is that the IW "arms race" across the Taiwan Strait has 
already begun. The increasing number and sophistication of Taiwanese 
IT firms investing in China has thus created politico-military externalities, 
apart from the economically beneficial decisions to relocate to the main-
land given globalization-induced pressures. The broader implications of 
these trends require further investigation. 
82This index is a composite ranking of sixty-two of th~ worl~'~ most globalized economies 
based on thirteen indicators grouped into four categones: pol!t1cal enga~em~nt, techn?logy, 
personal contact, and economic integration. See "Measunng Globahzatwn: Who s Up, 
Who's Down," Foreign Policy, January/February 2003,60-72. 
83Taiwan's conscription system and the island's widespread online population mean that the 
military can choose from a tech-savvy population to find capable hackers. 
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